Top table dinner: Non-Great British Railway operators – top ten takeaways

The evening saw a double helping of keynote speakers, with Martijn Gilbert (Managing Director of open access operator Lumo) offering thoughts on rail reform from an open access perspective, and Geoff Hobbs (director of public transport service planning for Transport for London (TfL)) offering insights on non-GBR passenger services from the perspective of the highly successful (non-GBR) Elizabeth Line and London Overground, as well as devolution.

Our top ten takeaways from the evening are set out below, inspired not only by the enthusiastic discussions within the room, but also by a visit to a museum dedicated to a famous Swedish music group just a few days later.

To those who joined us, thank you for doing so and we hope you enjoyed the evening. To those who weren't able to join, we hope you find the takeaways helpful and hope you'll be able to join us at a future dinner.
 

1. Don't Shut Me Down: Open access operators provide less than 1% of journeys on the GB rail network, but the impact they have outweighs this figure by quite some way and they will continue to have a big part to play in the industry. Open access operators returned to pre-pandemic passenger numbers far more rapidly than services currently procured by the Department for Transport (DfT) and have seen huge growth in journeys and associated revenue on the East Cost Main Line. Cities are transformed through direct connectivity to London, delivering huge economic benefits across the routes they serve and supporting wider economic growth, using available capacity in the timetable rather than cherry picking the best paths and timings. Open access contributes to the cost of the network and makes direct investments in the network, including at stations, whilst providing a different, and often cheaper, offering to the customer. The view was that many of the criticisms typically levied against open access operators were simply not founded in fact and instead had their origins in protectionism. The new industry structure must have checks and balances in place to ensure that protectionist behaviours are not embedded in the GBR model.
    
2. Waterloo: History is likely to repeat itself unless we think carefully about the outputs we want from the industry. In an environment constrained by available funding, and competing demands on the public purse, the industry is increasingly likely to want to attract inward private investment. For numerous reasons, this hasn't happened to date, but in moving to the future railway, we need to keep options open for that investment to be made. Certainty of the access and charging regime is a core part of that, giving the private sector confidence in the ability to invest and make a return on that investment. Access must be granted to the railway for a period which is commensurate with the level of investment. Tinkering with a well-established regime simply risks destroying confidence in the industry as being investible. Stability is needed in the short and longer terms, after many years of navel gazing.
    
3. Slipping Through My Fingers: Time slips away quickly and much time has already passed since the Williams Review (as it was then known) was announced. Linked to the need for stability described above is the need for visibility over investment pipelines and, more generally, visibility of a long term strategy for the industry. Rolling stock assets, for example, have a lifespan of approximately 35 years and in order to invest in them, some visibility of the ongoing need for their use is needed. Longer lease terms with a GBR entity could be a way of offering this certainty, but more generally a long term plan for the industry would be welcome, as rolling stock companies were not mentioned at all in the Rail Reform consultation. Opportunities for standardisation across the industry could also be considered as a way of achieving cost savings, but again future visibility is needed, without which innovation and opportunity could slip through fingers and be lost.
    
4. Gimme! Gimme! Gimme! (Access to the Network): A common theme emerging from discussions was the need for impartiality in capacity allocation and charging decisions in the GBR model. This applies to anyone who won't be a GBR operator, including freight, open access operators and services operated by devolved authorities such as TfL and Merseytravel. Impartiality was closely linked with accountability for GBR and the need for an independent regulator was emphasised. GBR operators simply mustn't be given preferential treatment. Many attendees were concerned by proposals to water down the powers of the regulator and the impact this could have on accountability, both to the taxpayer and to users of the railway. The Secretary of State for Transport is a very busy person, and it seems naïve to consider that they alone will be able to hold GBR to account when they are not involved in the day-to-day workings of the railway. Additionally, Secretary of States change and this could lead to instability. Accountability of the new organisation was therefore a real worry for attendees. Concerns were also raised about the sparseness of detail in the Rail Reform consultation, with some attendees considering that more detail was needed at this stage to be able to properly comment on plans – one example being offered being details of the proposed Access and Use Policy and licence for GBR. It was agreed that the industry will need to consider these closely once issued for comment.
    
5. I Have a Dream: The right behaviours needed to be embedded throughout the new GBR organisation and the power of subconscious behaviours must not be underestimated. This means the importance of an independent referee in the ORR is arguably increased in the future world where GBR becomes a more powerful entity, in stark contrast to the proposal set out in the Rail Reform consultation. The many years of ORR experience was considered to be valuable and needs to be retained. The semi-paradigm vision for the future railway set out in that consultation needs to be grounded in the practical realities of a multi-user environment, with appropriate checks and balances being essential. Guests also considered a figurehead for GBR to be essential as quickly as possible for the industry to gather around and lead the journey into the new world.
    
6. Money, Money, Money: The culture of GBR will play an important role in the decisions it takes. A key theme emerging from the Rail Reform consultation is the need for the new organisation to deliver cost savings. If this becomes a cultural norm, then the need to make savings will feed through to everyone in the organisation and this may not deliver the best outcomes. Connected with this, questions were posed about the opportunity to make savings: the often-castigated Schedule 8 performance regime will still be needed in some form where there are non-GBR operators using the network and therefore cannot be removed in its entirety. The interface with HM Treasury was also debated, the consensus seeming to be that HM Treasury needed to take a step back from its direct influence on railway operational matters.
    
7. Take A Chance on Me: Guests thought that more devolution to Mayoral Strategic Authorities (MSAs), and giving those MSAs better control over transport services serving their areas, was a good idea. History has shown that where there is local accountability, including to directly elected Mayors, quality of the transport network is generally higher and performance of that transport network generally better. Through the power of the ballot box, Mayors closer to the end user care much more about the transport experience and tend to be more responsive and accountable when issues emerge. MSAs tend to be able to respond more agilely to the changing needs of the local area and to focus on best use of available funding to maximise overall outcomes. Through gaining real life experience, MSAs tend to be a more informed customer with knowledge of the railway and better able to engage in discussions and ask the right questions.
    
8. Dancing Queen: An inherent tension was recognised between devolution to locally accountable bodies and the integration of GBR into a centralised body. At the moment, interested parties are dancing about this issue and there isn't an obvious way of reconciling the two. On the one hand, there is a need for whole-system thinking, as the desires of one MSA may impact on what can be delivered for another MSA, and of course there will continue to be longer distance services crossing multiple MSAs. Avoiding MSAs competing for limited funding pots was thought to be desirable. One question posed was whether "centralisation" in GBR was about administrative functions and/or control. The former is likely to be easier to deliver, but may not generate the same amount of cost savings. Centralisation of control could be more difficult as a centralised body may not be fully accountable, and may not care about the differing customer needs in different parts of the country. "Partnerships" and "collaboration" are all well and good, but have typically created expensive talking shops rather than delivering better outcomes and a focus on delivery was needed.
    
9. The Winner Takes It All: Some concern was expressed in the room about the ability of the industry to respond dynamically due for ingrained historic reasons. One example was offered about capacity being reserved in the timetable for services which rarely, if ever, use that capacity, which then prevented others from using it. There has been little use of the "use it or lose it" provisions, meaning expensive capacity is not used, and failing the end-user. Consideration should be given to making users pay for reserved but not used capacity to ensure only capacity which is likely to be used is reserved, and freeing up the remainder for better use. Attendees also thought speeding up decision-making processes to respond to demand would be desirable in a customer-focussed industry.
    
10. SOS: Overall, the room had many concerns about the Rail Reform consultation and what it meant for non-GBR users of the network. There were concerns about creating a large, unaccountable, organisation with control over the whole network, but without having a personal investment in the product of that control and its impact on the end user, as well as the possibility of not being open to change. There was also concern about the impact of limited investment being channelled away from non-GBR users of the railway network and the level of politicking this could create between centralised functions and MSAs. All of this led back to the conclusion that rather than curtailing the power of the ORR, a more powerful and proactive regulator was needed in the face of GBR to ensure fairness across the railway.